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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the origins of the reasonable man, an 
important concept in Anglo-saxon liability law, by 
zooming in on its conception in the mid-19th century and 
its preconceptions in antiquity.  As this has not been done 
before,  the goal of this thesis is to explain and analyze 
these origins in order to enlarge our understanding of this 
important development, and hitherto terra incognita, in 
modern legal history. Within this study, the term 
‘reasonable man’ is traced back in time through a study 
of both primary and secondary sources, including case-
law, works of (legal) philosophy and correspondences.
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INTRODUCTION
Leonardo da Vinci’s famous drawing, the Vitruvian Man, 
is often seen as a portrayal of the essential symmetry of 
the human body. Additionally, by displaying the ideal 
human proportions as described by the Roman architect 
Vitruvius, da Vinci’s drawing can be viewed as indicative 
of the human habit to measure the world through 
reference to itself. This tradition is manifested in various 
units of measurement such as the ell and the feet. In 
addition, there is a most peculiar anthropometric unit of 
measurement in which one’s behavior is measured in 
reference to the behavior of an average person: an ideal-
type. This legal unit of measurement is the reasonable 
person or reasonable man. The reasonable person, a less 
gendered ideal-type than the Victorian reasonable man,  is 
a standard in common law systems which is employed to 
determine whether one person has acted negligently vis-
à-vis another. Regardless, it has to be understood that the 
common law is not unique in this characteristic as 
offsprings of this reasonable person can be found in e.g. 
European law and he has more than a few continental 
siblings in civil law systems. Nonetheless, it is within the 
common law of liability, that the reasonable person 
occupies a most prominent and important position. 
Menand went as far as asserting that “the reasonable man 
is the fictional protagonist of modern liability theory” [1]. 
 In the midst of this praise,  it is surprising that 
little research has been done into the origins of this 
figure. As its historical roots have not been analyzed or 
explained in any comprehensive manner,  it is the goal of 
this research-thesis to do so. 
 The merit of studying the reasonable man from 
this perspective is that it transcends mere positive law 
and allows for a holistic explanation that accounts for the 
nexus of jurisprudence, intellectual history and public 
philosophy at which the concept lies. As Peter Watson 
puts it with great eloquence, the reasonable man “is one 
of the main points where the law treats the question: how 
are we to live together” [2].
I. A 19TH CENTURY PATERNITY TEST: THE BIRTH OF 
THE REASONABLE MAN
Watson, in his encyclopedic work Ideas,  wrongly asserts 
that Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s most important 
contribution to civil law is his invention of the reasonable 
man. In a way, this is justifiable for when writing a 
history of thought, covering a time-span ‘from Fire to 
Freud’, and basing it largely on secondary literature, one 
is bound to err a few times when it comes to the details. 
In this particular case, Watson based his false statement 
on Menand’s The Metaphysical Club. However, later in 
this book, Menand reveals an important nuance which 
was apparently missed by Watson in his reading and thus 
explains the mistake:
 Holmes didn’t  coin it [i.e. the term ‘reasonable man’] 
 - it began appearing in American and English 
 opinions around 1850 - but, along with his English 
 friend Frederick Pollock, he probably did as much 
 as anyone to define and establish it [3].
Regardless of the added nuance,  Menand’s statement is 
rather vague on the exact origins and therefore still leaves 
open the question of the reasonable man’s precise 
ancestry. Hence it is the goal of this section to unravel the 
concept’s 19th century genealogy. 
1. American Attorney
In 1880, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.,  then working as a 
Bostonian lawyer, was recommended as a speaker by A. 
Lawrence Lowell, the future president of Harvard 
University,  for a number of lectures at Harvard Law 
School. Holmes gladly accepted and, without notes, 
delivered twelve lectures about the evolution of legal 
doctrine to packed lecture halls. A year later,  he published 
a compilation of these Lowell lectures in the form of a 
book: The Common Law.
 In his lecture ‘trespass and negligence’, Holmes 
comments on the then relatively novel development of 
assessing negligence on the basis of what a man of 
ordinary prudence would have done [4]. In reference to 
this observed development, he cites an old English case, 
Vaughan v Menlove, which featured such a man of 
ordinary prudence. Editions may vary, but any diligent 
reader of the 1968 edition, of which the footnotes are 
based on the written marginalia in Holmes’ own copy, 
would never conclude that Holmes invented the 
reasonable man. The reason is that,  in a footnote to the 
relevant chapter, Holmes mentions a landmark English 
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case, Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Company, in 
which the figure of the reasonable man saw the light of 
life in English law. This does not only show that Holmes 
was well aware of the legal developments in Britain at 
the time but also that the reasonable man was not the 
product of his own mind. 
 Going back to Watson’s statement, insofar as 
American case-law is concerned, Brown v Kendall [5] 
was one of the earliest appearances of the standard of a 
‘prudent and cautious man’ in American law and for 
many scholars this case marks the watershed moment 
where the American law of negligence is born [6]. 
Although it dates from 1850 and fits the development 
described by Holmes, it has been decided without 
reference to Vaughan,  which predated it and the case is 
overall both legally and linguistically very different from 
both Vaughan and Blyth.  Hence, any relationship 
whatsoever between Brown in Massachusetts and 
Vaughan and Blyth in Britain seems very unlikely and 
therefore Brown will not be discussed any further. 
2. British Barrister 
It has been asserted that “along with his English friend 
Frederick Pollock, he probably did as much as anyone to 
define and establish it”. So how about this English 
friend? Sir Frederick Pollock was the British jurist and 
barrister with whom Holmes corresponded extensively. 
Fortunately, most of their correspondence has been 
preserved and it appears from Pollock’s letter of February 
10, 1880, that he and Holmes are very much in 
agreement on an objective standard of conduct for the 
law of negligence, based on an ideal-type [7]. Although 
Holmes and Pollock heavily discussed what they dubbed 
‘the external standard’, it is too much of a stretch to 
assert they did any defining or establishing. Of course 
Pollock wrote plenty by himself as well and in his 
seminal work, The Law of Torts, he wrote the following 
about the standard of care one has vis-à-vis another:
 ... we may say that, generally speaking, the 
 standard of duty is fixed by reference to what 
 we should expect in the like case from a man of 
 ordinary sense, knowledge and prudence [8].
That may be so,  but one must keep in mind that Pollock 
is merely describing the state of the law here and thus 
adds little more than a synthesis. Although Pollock 
engaged in such descriptions of the reasonable man more 
often,  he cannot be held to have defined or established it. 
As neither Holmes nor Pollock defined or established the 
reasonable man, one must dig deeper by looking into the 
Blyth and Vaughan cases,  since these were cited by both 
Holmes and Pollock in reference to the origins of the 
reasonable man. 
3. English Judge
Vaughan was in fact the first case in which the standard 
of ‘a prudent man’, a clear predecessor to the later 
nomenclature, was applied to a case of negligence. The 
facts aside, the speech by the chief justice is the most 
instructive when it comes to the rationale behind this 
reasonable man avant le mot. Tindal, C.J. stated that the 
assertion that the question ought to have been whether 
the defendant had acted honestly and bona fide to the 
best of his own judgment, as was stated by the 
defendant’s council, “would leave so vague a line as to 
afford no rule at all”. He concluded that:
 Instead, therefore, of saying that the liability for 
 negligence should be co-extensive with the judgment 
 of each individual ... we ought rather to adhere to the 
 rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such 
 as a man of ordinary prudence would observe [9].
The creation of this ‘man of ordinary prudence’  is 
significant for more than just the fact that it foretold and 
preceded the ascent of the reasonable man. Firstly, it is 
relevant because the court created an open norm by 
which negligence, an emerging field of law of which the 
basics yet had to be established, could be determined. 
Secondly,  by using an open norm, the standard could 
withstand the test of time, for what is considered ordinary 
prudence is highly dependent on dominant social mores, 
which are far from static. What is more, although strictly 
speaking the reasonable man restricts man’s conduct,  the 
standard seems rooted in a firm belief in the perfectibility 
of man, for it presumes that man is capable of acting like 
a man of ordinary prudence and that not living up to this 
capability can be blameworthy.
 After the ruling in Vaughan it took nearly twenty more 
years until the term ‘reasonable man’ was coined. In 
1856, the ideal-type was finally consolidated in the case 
of Blyth [10]. Kennedy for the respondent, invoked 
Vaughan in his speech, upon which Baron Alderson, who 
would later write the majority opinion, interrupted the 
barrister and asked: “is it an accident which any man 
could have foreseen?”[11]. In his ruling, Alderson 
provided the classic definition of negligence in English 
law: 
 Negligence is the omission to do something which a 
 reasonable man, guided upon those considerations 
 which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, 
 would do, or doing something which a prudent and 
 reasonable man would not do [12].
Although chance remains that Alderson conceived the 
concept out of thin air, this seems rather unlikely because 
there is a remarkable similarity, also pointed out by 
Zwalve [13], between the definition in Blyth and the 
following excerpt from D. 9, 2 (Ad legem Aquiliam),  31 
(Paulus libro decimo ad Sabinum): “culpam autem esse, 
quod cum a diligente provideri poterit, non esset 
provisum aut tum denuntiatum esset, cum periculum 
evitari non possit”.  This freely translates to English as: 
“negligence is to not foresee what a diligent man would 
have foreseen or has been warned when the danger could 
not be avoided anymore”. Of course it is not certain 
whether Alderson alluded to this for he might as well 
have had the personne raisonnable from the French Code 
Civil in mind or both. 
 One development pointing in the direction of D. 9, 2, 
31 as an explanation for the apparent but implicit 
intertextuality is the revival of Roman law in the 
mid-19th century. In Germany, it was popularized by 
Pandectists (who took their name from the Greek term 
for the Digests) such as von Savigny, whose ideas were 
also received enthusiastically elsewhere in Europe [14]. 
In England, Sir Henry Maine published an essay in 1856, 
the very same year in which Blyth was decided,  pleading 
in favor of an increased knowledge of Roman Law [15].
 Although we may never be exactly certain,  when 
taking into account the magnitude of the foreign 
parallels, it is safe to conclude that Baron Alderson found 
inspiration for the coinage of the term ‘reasonable man’ 
and his definition of negligence outside of England’s 
borders. Although both the French and Roman option are 
feasible, it is most likely that he transposed the definition 
of Roman culpa (negligence) from D. 9, 2, 31 to 19th 
century English law because of the revived interest in 
Roman law.
Sub-Conclusion
Although the outlines of this development are clearest 
after Blyth, what a reasonable man would do in any given 
circumstances was and is still very much decided by 
referring to an average man in society, ‘the man in the 
street’  or ‘the man on the clapham omnibus’  [16].  By 
being understood in reference to an average man in 
society, the reasonable man is rooted in the spirits of 
positivism, the idea that information derived from 
sensory experience is the exclusive source of knowledge, 
and realism, which claims to describe and reproduce life 
as it actually is [17]. Moreover,  the concept is indicative 
of the widespread belief in human reason and man as a 
measurement of society, which is rooted in the 
hegemonic position of classical liberalism in 19th century 
England and the rise of secular humanism paralleling it. 
What is more,  the word ‘reasonable’  in reasonable man 
does and did not denote “the reason of syllogisms, ... 
metaphysics and aprioristic logic” but “a reason focused 
on empirical reality, on ‘facts,’  on ‘common sense,’  and 
on probabilistic thinking” [18].  In this sense,  with the 
inception of the reasonable man, the heritage of the 
empiricism of the British Enlightenment revealed itself. 
In any case, as its traits are so in line with these modern 
socio-cultural norms and intellectual currents,  it can be 
said that the reasonable man is the embodiment of 
modernity. 
II. ANTECEDENTS IN ANTIQUITY: CONCEPTIONS OF 
THE REASONABLE MAN AVANT LA LETTRE
In the previous section, the similarity between D. 9,  2 (Ad 
legem Aquiliam),  31 (Paulus libro decimo ad Sabinum) 
and Baron Alderson’s judgement in Blyth has been 
highlighted.  As this definition of culpa can be seen as a 
conception of the reasonable man avant la lettre, the goal 
of the section at hand is to further explore it. 
1. Roman Emperor
As the Western Roman empire ceased to exist in 476 AD, 
the Byzantine emperor Justinian I (527-565 AD), 
hereinafter referred to as ‘Justinian’, tried to restore it to 
its former glory. An undisputed part of this former glory 
was the Roman law and Justinian had it rewritten in a 
uniform manner in his corpus iuris civilis, the entire body 
of civil law. One part of this corpus, the Digests, consists 
of an accumulation of the ius, the writings of classical 
Roman jurists [19]. The Digests are also the source from 
whence the definition of culpa, to which Alderson 
probably ought to have paid lipservice, is taken. If this 
hypothesis is correct, then the definition of negligence in 
English law is of Justinianic vintage. Zimmermann notes 
that D. 9, 2 ,  31 is attributed to Paul but that Paul gave 
credit to Quintus Mucius Scaevola [20]. Scaevola was a 
Roman lawyer who died in 82 BC and is credited with 
inventing the distinction between dolus (fault) and culpa 
around 100 BC [21].  In a way,  the reasonable man, 
although heavily shaped by distinctly modern intellectual 
currents, goes back to the very roots of liability law. 
2. Greek Philosopher
Kübler links the trichotomy dolus-culpa-casus in Roman 
law to the trichotomy adikèma-hamartèma-atychia in the 
work of Aristotle with culpa linked to hamartèma [22]. 
Although there is no scholarly agreement on Kübler’s 
interpretation, even his most vehement opponent, Daube, 
concludes that “some influence [i.e. of the Greek scheme 
on the Roman liability troika] is highly probable” [23]. 
Moreover, in his letter to Holmes on February 10, 1880, 
Pollock links the reasonable man to ώς άν ό ϕρόνιµος 
όρίσειεν (an ho phronimos horizeien) translates as by 
which the prudent/practically wise (phronimos) person 
would determine it [24]. For these reasons, it is worth 
further exploring a possible relationship between the 
concept negligence and the work of Aristotle.
 From the verb αµαρτάνειν (hamartanein), which 
translates as ‘to miss the mark’, two nouns can be 
formed: αµάρτηµα (hamartèma) and αµαρτία (hamartia). 
In Aristotle’s Poetics (1453a7-10), the term hamartia is 
featured. Aristotle argues that in the best tragic plots the 
protagonist is “the intermediate kind of personage, a man 
not preeminently virtuous and just, whose misfortune, 
however, is brought upon him not by vice and depravity 
but by some fault [hamartia]” (1453a7-10) [25]. The 
latter is not a defect of character but an event or action by 
an agent who errs in some way. For the purpose of this 
thesis, where one is not concerned with the writing of 
plays and prose but with law, it needs to be stressed there 
is debate among scholars as to whether hamartia is 
necessarily unavoidable [26]. No conclusive answer to 
this matter has been given and based on what has been 
recovered from the Poetics, probably no conclusive 
answer can be given. Still, it is the answer to this 
question that the justification of equating culpa with 
hamartèma or hamartia hinges upon. For if an action can 
not be avoided, it is a classic case of force majeure and 
the agent’s conduct might be negligent but defensible. 
Since negligence is based on an agent erring and the 
erring often results from a flaw in character, the 
meanings of both concepts seem dissimilar as there is no 
complete overlap. In the end, whatever the similarity 
between the concepts, in the real-life tragedies of 
negligence occurring in modern courtrooms, the 
reasonable person is the mark that the tortfeasor missed: 
hamartanein.
CONCLUSION
When the most famous student of Plato’s Academy 
explored the issue of how men are best to live,  he laid the 
foundations for a common law concept dealing with the 
related question of how we are to live together. 
Approximately 870 years after Aristotle wrote his 
seminal works,  a Byzantine emperor attempted to restore 
the Roman empire to its former glory. In the process, 
Justinian had a collection of fundamental works on 
Roman law put together by a team of jurists. An 
important part of this Corpus Iuris Civilis were the 
Digests, an accumulation of the writings of classical 
Roman jurists. One Digest, D. 9,  2, 31, contains a 
definition of culpa which appears to be influenced by an 
important concept in Aristotle’s work: hamartèma. In 
1856, in the heydays of classical liberalism, an English 
judge established the classic definition of negligence. In 
the spirit of a revived interest in Roman law throughout 
Western Europe, he seems to have borrowed from D. 9, 
2, 31 when conceiving the reasonable man. This term 
displays a grand belief in free will, practical human 
reason, and the perfectibility of man; a view which was 
ushered in by the British Enlightenment. Though the 
Latin from antiquity was translated by Baron Alderson to 
19th century legal English, no intersubjectivity of 
meaning was provided and the meaning of this new 
concept was yet to be given shape. With God about to be 
proclaimed dead and Comte’s social physics taking off,  it 
is far from surprising that the notion of the reasonable 
man became both highly secular, as man became the 
official legal measurement of human conduct, and highly 
positivistic and realistic, since the standard was not based 
on a fictional account of man but on the average man. 
Two learned jurists showed particular interest in this 
external standard of conduct and although they did not 
invent, define or establish it, Pollock and Holmes 
probably popularized the concept through its use in their 
works. These are the origins of the reasonable man and 
the context in which he came into this world. Nowadays, 
the less gendered reasonable person has many offsprings 
in various fields of law, but he still appears regularly in 
courtrooms in e.g. the United Kingdom and the United 
States to establish whether a duty of care has been 
breached. As such, he can truly be called the fictional 
protagonist of modern liability law.
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